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Hodder v. Goodyear; End of the Road
for the Useful Life Defense?
INTRODUCTION
In December 1981, service station mechanic Dale Hodder
-as replacing a tire on a logging truck when the tire's rim ex-
ploded, seriously injuring him. The tire rim,1 manufactured by
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, was an old model discon-
tinued years earlier when Goodyear realized the danger of ex-
plosion when installing the rim.2 Goodyear publicized the
dangers in using the rim,3 but Hodder claimed he did not see
the warnings and sued Goodyear for failure to warn.4 Goodyear
asserted; among other defenses,5 Minnesota's untested useful
1. The tire rim was a model KWX multi-piece assembly made by Good-
year in 1955. Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 829
(Minn. 1988), petitionfor cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3296 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1988) (No.
88-626). The multi-piece rim design was common before the development of
the single-piece rim in the 1950s. Although the rim involved in Hodder's acci-
dent was corroded and worn, there were indications in the record that the rim
was still serviceable. Id.
2. Goodyear discontinued manufacture of the KWX model in 1962, seven
years after it learned of the possible pressurized separation of the multi-piece
rim. I. at 829.
3. Goodyear conducted an extensive campaign to warn of the dangers of
the multi-piece rim, but did not recall the product. The manufacturer did,
however, discuss the possibility of recall with the National Highway Safety
Administration. Brief for Dale Hodder at 8, Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1988) (Nos. C3-87-419, C2-87-511).
4. Failure to warn is a violation of the maxiufacturer's duty of care under
product liability law. AMERIcAN LAW OF PRODUCiS LIABILITy § 1.13 (3d ed.
1987). A manufacturer must exercise due care to avoid unreasonable risks of
harm to persons using the product for foreseeable purposes. Id This duty of
care extends to all phases of the manufacturing process, including design,
choice of materials, tests to discover potential hazards, and warnings provided
to users. Id
Hodder withdrew his original claim for manufacturing defect and the jury
found no design defect in the rim. Hodder, 426 N.W.2d at 829.
5. Goodyear also contended it had no continuing duty to warn, primarily
because it had no knowledge of the danger at the time of sale, and that post-
sale knowledge of danger is not a basis for a duty to warn. Hoddcer, 426 N.W.2d
at 832-33. In the alternative, Goodyear argued that it met its duty to warn by
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life statute,6 which makes expiration of a product's useful life
prior to an accident "a defense" to any subsequent claim.7 The
Minnesota Supreme Court held for Hodder even though the
jury found that the useful life of the rim had expired before the
accident 8 The court determined that the statute made expira-
tion of a product's useful life a factor relevant to determining
the comparative fault between the user and the manufacturer.9
Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.1 0 is the first case in
the nation making a substantive interpretation of a statute in-
corporating the useful life concept. The central issue in Hodder
was whether Minnesota's legislature intended the statute to
make expiration of a product's useful life evidence of the user's
fault or to barn the user's claim altogether. Holding that the
statute did not bar claims, the court found the statute ambigu-
ous and incoherent and questioned the practicality of the useful
life concept. The Hodder decision is significant nationally be-
cause the Minnesota statute was a model for useful life statutes
extensively advertising the dangers of the KWX rim through dealer contact,
brochures, films, and other warnings. Id at 834. Goodyear argued also that
failure to warn was not the proximate cause of Hodder's injuries, because Hod-
der should have been aware of the dangers. Id. at 833.
The trial court held for Hodder on all these issues and the Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that Goodyear's decision to continue sell-
ing K-rims despite knowledge of the dangers and Goodyear's voluntary efforts
to warn gave rise to a continuing duty to warn. Id. at 832-34. The court also
upheld the jury's findings that Goodyear's efforts to warn were inadequate and
that failure to warn was the proximate cause of the accident. d.
The court also considered Goodyear's arguments concerning allocation of
fault among Goodyear and the other defendants, as well as a variety of other
issues relating to evidence, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and pre-verdict
interest. Id. at 835, 838-41. Hodder also appealed on the issues of post-verdict
interest and allocation of the compensatory verdict. Brief for Dale Hodder at
47-49, Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1988)
(Nos. C3-87419, C2-87-511).
The court awarded $3,368,916 in compensatory damages and $4,000,000 in
punitive damages, but remanded the case to make minor adjustments in allo-
cation of the award. Hodder, 426 N.W.2d at 841. Goodyear's petition for certio-
rari to the United States Supreme Court on October 14, 1988, argued that the
punitive damages award violated Goodyear's due process rights under the four-
teenth amendment. 57 U.S.L.W. 3296 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1988) (No. 88-626).
6. MINN. STAT. § 604.03 (1986).
7. Id.
8. Hodder, 426 N.W.2d at 829.
9. Id. at 832.
10. 426 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1988), petition for cert .filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3296
(U.S. Oct. 14, 1988) (No. 88-626).
11. Use of the word bar in this Comment connotes an absolute prohibition
against bringing a product liability claim.
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in other states. The court's observations in Hodder thus apply
to most useful life statutes.
This Comment analyzes Hodder to determine whether the
court interpreted the statute correctly and whether the court
correctly implied that useful life may not be a workable con-
cept. Part I reviews the common-law treatment of prolonged
safe use of a product as a consideration in determining liability
and discusses the 6vents preceding the enactment of the useful
life statute. Part II details the holding in Hodder. Part III ana-
lyzes the holding and argues that the court reached the correct
result even though it incorrectly found the statute ambiguous.
Part IV addresses the problems with Minnesota's useful life
statute that became evident in Hodder and offers possible solu-
tions. -The Comment concludes that careful drafting can pro-
duce a workable useful life statute and proposes a model
statute that aims to resolve some of the problems that the Min-
nesota Supreme Court encountered in Iodder.
I. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF TIME-LAPSE IN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES
Throughout the development of product liability law,
courts have refined the law in an effort to allocate properly the
responsibility between the manufacturer 12 and the user when a
product causes injury. Through the rise and fall of the privity
rule,' 3 the advent of strict liability,' 4 and the assortment of
12. This Comment uses the phrase manufacturer liability broadly, recog-
nizing that product liability has been extended in many jurisdictions to retail
sellers, distributors, designers, and others. See AMmuCAN LAW OF PRODUCTS
LIAB!LITY §§ 1:14-:15 (3d ed. 1987).
13. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit de-
fined the rule of privity as the principle that "a contractor, manufacturer, or
vendor is not liable to third parties who have no contractual relations with
him for negligence in the construction, manufacture, or sale of the article he
handles." Huset v. J.1. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 868 (8th Cir.
1903); see also Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402
(1842) (one of earliest cases establishing rule of privity).
Minnesota began its abandonment of the privity rule long before the lead-
ing cases of Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050,
1054 (1916), and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960). In Schubert v. J.R Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331, 51 N.W. 1103 (1892), the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that a ladder manufacturer had a duty of care
in tort to the employee of the purchaser of the ladder, irrespective of any con-
tract. Id at 340, 51 N.W. at 1106. Much later, the court abolished privity in
contract with respect to implied warranties, see Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn.
543, 561, 99 N.W.2d 670, 682-83 (1959), and express warranties, see McCormack
v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 340-41, 154 N.W.2d 488, 500-01 (1967).
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common-law and statutory defenses against liability,1 5 courts
and legislatures have attempted to develop a system that gen-
erally equates liability with fault.1 6 In dealing with liability for
older products, many courts find that when a consumer uses a
product safely for a prolonged period of time, the user's con-
duct rather than a product defect is the more likely cause of a
subsequent accident.17 These courts reason that if a defect
makes the product dangerous, an accident will occur either as
soon as a consumer uses the product or early in the product's
life.' 8 Prolonged use of the product also provides more oppor-
tunity for the user's contributory negligence.' 9
Common law originally provided that prolonged safe use of
a product conclusively proved that the product was not defec-
tive.20 Commentators now reject such a conclusive presump-
14. Minnesota approved strict liability for product liability in McCormack,
278 Minn. at 340-41, 154 N.W.2d at 501 (dictum).
15. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
16. The fault principle has ancient roots, but perhaps was stated most
clearly in Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 295-96 (1850) (establishing
that plaintiff must show that defendant acted with unlawful intention or that
defendant otherwise was at fault). See generally Rabin, The Historical Devel-
opment of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925, 925-28
(1981) (outlining traditional analysis of development of fault principle, but sug-
gesting a different genesis).
17. Acknowledging the drawbacks of this inference, the New York Court
of Appeals endorsed the idea, stating
We are willing to sacrifice the small percentage of meritorious claims
that might arise after the statutory period has run in order to prevent
the many unfounded suits that would be brought and sustained
against manufacturers ad infinitum. Surely an injury resulting from a
defective product many years after it has'been manufactured, pre-
sumptively at least, is due to operation and maintenance.... [W]e
must make that presumption conclusive.
Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 346, 253 N.E.2d 207, 210,
305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 495 (1969), overruled by Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach.
Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975).
Legislatures endorsed this approach by enacting statutes of repose and
useful life statutes. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 22.
19. See Fredericks v. American Export Lines, Inc., 227 F.2d 450, 452 (2d
Cir. 1955) (stating that although passage of time does not eliminate liability for
negligent wrongdoer, it is relevant in determining whether defect or product
deterioration or misuse caused accident), cert denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956);
Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 336, 319 A.2d 914, 923
(1974) (mentioning notion of useful life of product); see generally Prosser, Te
Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791,
844-45 (1966) (collecting cases on legal effects of prolonged use).
20. Lynch v. International Harvester Co., 60 F.2d 223, 224-25 (10th Cir.
1932), overruled by Pryor v. Lee C. Moore Corp., 262 F.2d 673, 675 (10th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959).
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tion, however, because many defects do not become obvious or
cause an accident until the user subjects the product to certain
conditions.2 ' To provide flexibility for such cases, courts ad-
justed the common law to make prolonged use of a product
only one factor in determining whether a defect was the proxi-
mate cause of the accident.22
A. TREATMENT OF TIME-LAPSE IN MINNESOTA COMMON LAW
Minnesota courts are among those holding that prolonged
safe use of a product gives rise to an inference that the product
was not defective.23 In Kerr v. Corning Glass Works,24 for ex-
ample, the court found that a consumer's use of a glass baking
dish for at least seven months supported an inference that the
user's handling of the dish, rather than a defect, caused the
dish to explode in an oven.25 Lacking any evidence of a defect,
the court denied the claim.2 6
Minnesota courts also acknowledge affirmative defenses to
product liability based on more tangible evidence of the user's
improper conduct. Liability thus exists only when the con-
sumer uses the product as intended or as reasonably foreseen
21. See Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive
Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 796, 844-45 (1983). Professor Schwartz uses the exam-
ple of an automobile bumper that has a defect which makes it not crash-
worthy. This defect likely will not be noticed until the automobile's first
crash, which could occur late in the product's life. Other product defects actu-
ally might require the passage of time to become evident; improperly labeled
drugs, for example, may cause diseases whose symptoms do not surface for
many years. Barring old claims on these kinds of products results in complete
immunity for the manufacturer. Id.
22. Prolonged use of a product was held to be "one factor, albeit an impor-
tant one, in the determination of the factual issue whether the [defect or] neg-
ligent manufacture proximately caused the harm." Pryor, 262 F.2d at 675; see
also Fredericks v. American Export Lines, Inc., 227 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1955)
(holding that "[tihe passage of time confers no immunity upon a negligent
wrongdoer; but it has relevance to the likelihood, depending upon the circum-
stances of a particular case, that deterioration due to use, perhaps accelerated
by misuse, will be mistaken by a jury for a defect due to negligent manufac-
ture or fabrication"), cert denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956).
23. See Kerr v. Corning GlassWorks, 284 Minn. 115, 119, 169 N.W.2d 587,
589 (1969); see also Cerepak v. Revlon, Inc., 294 Minn. 268, 271, 200 N.W.2d 33,
36 (1972) (following Kerr in principle but distinguishing its facts); Holkestad v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 288 Minn. 249, 255-56, 180 N.W.2d 860, 865 (1970) (up-
holding judgment against beverage bottling company, distinguishing Kerr be-
cause insufficient time had passed to give rise to inference that plaintiff's
conduct caused accident).
24. 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587 (1969).
25. 1d. at 118-19, 169 N.W.2d at 589.
26. Id.
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by the manufacturer,27 and the manufacturer can escape liabil-
ity when using the product involves a reasonable and obvious
risk.2 8 Proof that the user mishandled, modified, or failed to
perform proper maintenance on the product may provide a de-
fense.29 A court also may find that a user assumes the risk of
injury if he consents to or knows of the defect.30
27. A product is defective, and the manufacturer consequently liable, only
if the product "fails to perform reasonably, adequately and safely the normal,
anticipated or specified use to which the manufacturer intends that it be put,
and it is unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff." Daleiden v. Carborundum
Co., 438 F.2d 1017, 1021 (8th Cir. 1971) (applying Minnesota law). In Holm v.
Sponco -lffg., 324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982), however, the Minnesota Supreme
Court may have broadened manufacturer's liability by holding that:
[A] manufacturer is obligated to exercise that degree of care in this
plan or design so as to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm to anyone
who is likely to be exposed to the danger when the product is used in
the manner for which the product was intended, as well as an unin-
tended yet reasonably foreseeable'use.
Id at 212 (quoting Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 385-86, 348 N.E.2d 571,
577-78, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 120-21 (1976)). The language in Holm appears to ex-
tend a manufacturer's obligation beyond anticipated use to include "unin-
tended yet reasonably foreseeable use." Id
28. Holm, 324 N.W.2d at 212. The plaintiff in Holm was injured severely
when he contacted a high voltage power line while operating an aerial ladder
manufactured by the defendant. IME at 209. When the plaintiff claimed that
the ladder was defective in design because it was not insulated and equipped
with safety devices to guard against electrocution, the defendant argued that a
manufacturer has no duty to guard against hazards which should be obvious to
the user. Id at 208 (citing Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 307
Minn. 48, 57, 240 N.W.2d 303, 308 (1976)). In overruling Halvorson, the court
established a "reasonable care" balancing test in which the manufacturer has a
duty to design products that do not present unreasonable risks to the user, and
the user's duty includes recognition of obvious risks. The import of this
change is that liability for truly defective products will not be excused merely
by virtue of being obvious, and both the manufacturer and the user have an
incentive to use care. Holm, 324 N.W.2d at 211-13.
29. In a product liability case involving a manufacturer's failure to.warn a
user of dangers inherent in use of the product, the duty to warn depends on
the foreseeabiity of the injury; the manufacturer need not foresee improper
use of the product resulting from improper maintenance. Westerberg v.
School District 792, 276 Minn. 1, 7-9, 148 N.W.2d 312, 316-17 (1967). Later cases
refined Westerberg, providing that a duty to warn may exist when the manu-
facturer should anticipate the user's improper maintenance and "the manufac-
turer has no reason to believe that users will comprehend that risk."
Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 925 (Minn. 1986).
Courts also recognize modification of a product as a product liability de-
fense. See Westerberg, 276 Minn. at 9, 148 N.W.2d at 317 (citing Tuttle v. U.S.
Slicing Mach. Co., 335 F.2d 63, 64 (4th Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (holding that
user's removal of safety grill on meat grinder defeated claim against
manufacturer)).
30. Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343, 351-53 (Minn. 1979) (holding
that fireman killed by explosion of allegedly defective gas tank assumed risk
1086 [Vol. 73:1081
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B. THE PRODUCT LIABILITY CRISIS AND STATUTORY REFORM
Although these common-law defenses to products liability
evolved to protect manufacturers when a defect probably was
not the cause of the accident, popular perception of a product
liability crisis3 ' motivated consideration of additional limits on
liability. Manufacturers complained that strict product liability
resulted in an avalanche of product liability claims, creating un-
certainty as to the manufacturer's potential liability3 2 Manu-
facturers further claimed that this uncertainty led to steep
liability insurance rate increases and in some cases made insur-
of explosion); see generally Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 24-26, 192
N.W.2d 826, 826-28 (1971) (outlining Minnesota's assumption of risk doctrine).
31. The nature of the "product liability crisis" was studied exhaustively by
the Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, organized by the United
States Department of Commerce. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY
TAsK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT, (1977), reprinted in 5 L.
FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY App. G at 585-1288 (1988)
[hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. Compiling information from manufactur-
ers, the insurance industry, consumer interests, and its own studies, the task
force characterized the product liability problem as follows:
In 1975, an apparent problem (some sources said "crisis") arose in the
field of product liability. A number of manufacturers and business
periodicals alleged that product liability insurance had become un-
available or unaffordable. The consequences of this situation included
the possibilities that businesses might terminate because they were
unable to get coverage; that injured persons would be unable to en-
force product liability judgments; and that manufacturers would be
hesitant to produce some products that would be useful in our society.
It was also alleged that the system of private insurance in the field of
product liability was breaking down. Finally, it was alleged that rela-
tively few injured persons benefited from the system.
Id- at 646.
The task force identified three major causes of the product liability prob-
lem: liability insurance ratemaking procedures; the tort-litigation system; and
manufacturing practices. Id at 667. After extensive study, the task force rec-
ommended solutions to these problems. See infra notes 60-65 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Model Uniform Product Liability Act).
The "product liability crisis" was perceived clearly in Minnesota in the
late 1970s. Manufacturers and insurance company representatives testified
before legislative committees that liability insurance rates were rising and un-
availability of insurance might become a problem. An Act Relating to CivilAc-
tions: Hearings on H.F. 338 Before Senate Judiciary Committee, 70th Minn.
Leg. (1978) (on audiotape available at Legislative Reference Library, State Of-
fice Building, St. Paul, Minnesota) [hereinafter Judiciary Committee Tape];
see also Heins, Statutory Changes in Minnesota Tort Law, HENNEPIN LAw.,
Sept.-Oct. 1978, at 6, 6-9 (summarizing products liability problem); Industry
Threatened by Slew of Liability Suits, St. Paul Pioneer Press, Aug. 4, 1976,
§ A, at 2, col. 1.
32. See Industry Threate2zed by Slew of Liability Suits, St. Paul Pioneer
Press, Aug. 4, 1976, § A, at 2 col. 1.
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ance unavailable.33
Manufacturer complaints led eventually to the formation
of the Interagency Task Force on Product Liability,34 which in-
vestigated the product liability crisis and suggested improve-
ments in product liability law. 5 One suggestion was that
legislatures enact statutes of limitation and statutes of repose to
increase certainty for manufacturers by barring claims not
brought within specified deadlines.3 6
C. STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND STATUTES OF REPOSE
Statutes of limitation and statutes of repose both bar claims
after a specified time period, but they do so in different ways.
Statutes of limitation set a specified period during which a
plaintiff may bring a claim, commencing when the injury oc-
curs.37 These statutes reflect the principle that a plaintiff has a
duty to bring a timely claim.38 Statutes of repose also limit the
time period in which a user may bring a claim, but this time pe-
riod commences once the user receives the product 3 9 Statutes
of repose stem partly from the premise that a products liability
claim involving an older product actually has less merit.40
One underlying assumption of the product liability statute
of repose parallels the common-law theory that use of a prod-
uct over time decreases the likelihood that a product defect
caused an accident and increases the likelihood that an inter-
vening factor caused the product to fail.41 Another premise un-
derlying statutes of repose is that a manufacturer's records may
become stale or unavailable the longer a consumer uses the
product, diminishing the accuracy of product liability judg-
33. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 646.
34. See supra note 31.
35. The task force published these recommendations in the TASK FORCE
REPORT in 1977. See supra note 31. The MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY
ACT (Dep't of Commerce 1979), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979) [here-
inafter MUPLA], was based on the findings in this report. See infra text ac-
companying notes 60-65 (describing MUPLA). All citations and references to
MUPLA are to the 1979 version reprinted in the Federal Register.
36. TAsx FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 1040-49.
37. Minnes6ta's statute of limitation for product liability claims, for exam-
ple, requires a plaintiff to make a claim within six years from the date of in-
jury. MINN. STAT. § 541.05(5) (1988).
38. Finley v. Erickson, 122 Minn. 235, 239, 142 N.W. 198, 199 (1913).
39. See McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product
Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 579, 584-87 (1981) (describing
several definitions of statute of repose).
40. Id& at 582-87.
41. See supra note 22.
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ments.4W 2 A further policy argument for statutes of repose is
that business planning requires "certainty" and that liability for
older products creates an excessive burden.43
These reasons for a product liability statute of repose have
some intuitive appeal, -but commentators raise strong criti-
cisms. 44 Although many defects become evident early in the
product's life,4 5 some defects remain hidden, causing accidents
only later in the life of the product. 46 When an uncommon
event, such as extreme temperature, is necessary to expose the
defect, a statute of repose could bar an otherwise meritorious
claim.47 The same is true when a consumer uses a product less
often or less rigorously than normal, and consequently does not
test the product's limits as early as a typical user might.48 Crit-
ics doubt that staleness of records really presents a significant
problem for manufacturers 49 and question whether uncertainty
from old product liability claims really causes high liability in-
surance rates.5 0
Despite these criticisms, many legislatures accepted the
prospect of barring a few meritorious claims as a necessary
trade-off in meeting the manufacturer's need for certainty.5 - In
response to the perceived product liability crisis and the Inter-
42. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 845-46.
43. See Martin, A Statute of Repose for Product Liability Claims, 50 FORD-
HAlM L. REV. 745, 747 (1981).
44. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 848-49.
45. Many defects are so obvious that they prevent use of the product. Ex-
amples are the tire that does not hold air due to a defective seal and the lawn-
mower that will not start because of a defective ignition.
46. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 84445.
47. See id.
48. An example is the elderly lady who drives her car only once a week
down the block to the grocery store. Her well-preserved car will not experi-
ence the rigors of "ordinary use," such as extended freeway driving. Suppose
the car is not used on the freeway until after the repose period runs. When
the car finally is used on a long trip, latent defects tested for the first time
become evident and cause an accident. A fixed-term statute of repose bars a
claim in this situation, even though the defect normally would have been ex-
posed early in the product's life.
49. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 846-47.
50. See Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Product Liability
Statutes of Limitations, 56 N.C.L. Rzv. 663, 664 n.10 (1978) (citing insurance
industry studies that fail to show substantial connection between old-product
liability and higher insurance rates).
51. See, e.g., An Act Relating to Civil Actions: Debate on H.F. 338 Before
the Minnesota Senate, 70th Minn. Leg. (1978) (on audiotape available at the
Legislative Reference Library, State Office Building, St. Paul, Minnesota)
[hereinafter Floor Debate Tape] (statement of Senator Dieterich) (describing
act as "a limitation on the consumer's right to recover").
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agency Report, twenty-one states enacted statutes of repose.52
Most commonly, states enacted fixed-term statutes of repose,
barring claims not brought within a specified number of years
after the user receives the product.53 A minority of states, how-
ever, attempted to address the inherent inequities of imposing
an arbitrary repose period on all types of products4 -by making
the repose period depend on the "useful life" of the product.55
D. THE USEFUL LFE STATUTE OF REPOSE
Under a useful life statute of repose, the time period for
bringing a claim corresponds with the duration the product is
safely available for use.5 6 Assessing a manufacturer's liability
for each product individually, the useful life approach refines
the statute of repose concept by accommodating the different
periods of durability reasonably expected from a rubber auto-
mobile tire, for example, and a steel automobile tire rim.57 The
useful life approach creates a new trial issue because a court
must determine the useful life of the product involved in the
52. Fourteen states passed fixed-term statutes of repose. See ALA. CODE
§ 6-5-502 (Supp. 1988) (10 years); Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (Supp. 1980)
(12 years); FLA. STAT. § 95.031 (Supp. 1988) (12 years); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-
11(b)(2) (Supp. 1988) (10 years); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-213 (1984) (10
years); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5 (Burns. Supp. 1988) (10 years); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 411.310(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) (8 years); MICH.
COMP. LAws § 600.5805(9) (1987) (10 years); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224 (1985)
(10 years); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2 (I) (1983) (12 years); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 28-01.1-02 (Supp. 1987) (10 years); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905(1) (1988) (8
years); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-13 (1985) (10 years); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3
(1987) (6 years).
See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-116-105(c) (1987); CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-577a (West Supp. 1988); IDAHO CODE § 6-1303(1)(a) (Supp. 1988); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3303 (1983); mINN. STAT. § 604.03 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-28-103 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.060 (Supp. 1988).
53. See supra note 52.
54. The fundamental infirmity of the fixed-term statute of repose is its
imposition of one useful life period on all products. No one expects an auto-
mobile tire to last as long as the rim it is mounted on, for example, but a fixed-
term statute of repose treats both products identically. For durable products, a
fixed-term statute of repose overprotects the manufacturer by barring claims
long before the useful life of the product expires. The fixed-term statute also
may cause underdeterrence-reducing the manufacturer's incentive to make
products that will remain safe beyond the term of the statute.
55. See supra note 52.
56. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 604.03 (1988) (defining useful life as "the pe-
riod during which with reasonable safety the product should be useful to the
user").
57. For a sampling of the varying life expectancies of different products,
see THE DU-ABLITY FACTOR (R. Yepson ed. 1982).
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case.-5  Once a court determines the useful life of a product,
manufacturer liability extends only to the end of that life. 9
The states have implemented the useful life concept in var-
ious ways, but most follow the approach set forth in the Model
Uniform Product Liability Act ("MTUPLA"). 60 MUPLA bars a
claim when a manufacturer proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that the useful life of the product expired before the
accident.61 Manufacturers can meet their burden of proof by
using MUPLA's presumption that the useful life of any product
expires after ten years.62 The plaintiff, however, can overcome
that presumption with clear and convincing evidence that the
product's useful life did not expire.63 To measure the useful
life of a product, M-tPLA sets forth five considerations: wear
and tear on the product; the effect of natural deterioration due
to climate and conditions; repair and maintenance practices of
the user, similar users, and the seller; representations of the
seller as to the useful life of the product; and any modification
of the product by the user.64 Finally, MTJPLA exempts from its
coverage claims involving fraud or misrepresentation by the
seller, express warranties, and cases of prolonged exposure to a
product where the injury is not manifested until after the re-
pose period expires.65
Statutes of repose in Connecticut,6 6 Idaho,67 Kansas,68 and
Washington 9 mirror the MUPLA useful life provisions with
minor deviations.70 Arkansas and Tennessee also have statutes
58. In applying a fixed-term statute of repose, the only issue for the court
is whether the plaintiff brought the claim within the prescribed period of time,
already fixed by the statute. Useful life statutes require the court to deter-
mine the period of time during which claims will be allowed, based on the
product involved in the claim. After determining the repose period, the court
then can determine if the claim is timely.
59. See, MUPLA § 110 analysis. The Department of Commerce developed
MUPLA based on recommendations of the Interagency Task Force on Product
Liability. See supra note 31.
60. See MUPLA § 110.
61. d. § 110(A)(1).
62. 1& § 110(B)(1).
63. Id-
64. Id § 110(A)(1)(a-e).
65. Id- § 110(B)(2).
66. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a (West Supp. 1988).
67. IDAHO CODE § 6-1303(1)(2) (Supp. 1988).
68. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3303 (1983).
69. WAsH. REv. CODE § 7.72.060 (Supp. 1988).
70. Connecticut's useful life statute follows MLUPLA § 110 using slightly
different language, but omits MUPLA's exclusion for claims involving pro-
longed exposure. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a (West Supp. 1988). Con-
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incorporating useful life principles.7 1 Although most of these
statutes have been in effect for nearly a decade, few cases cite
them and they have not received significant judicial
construction. 72
E. MINNESOTA'S USEFUL LIFE STATUTE
Minnesota was the first state to enact a useful life statute,73
and the statute's legislative history reveals that the statute
arose in response to a perceived product liability crisis.74 Min-
necticut does provide an exclusion for asbestos-related claims. I& § 52-577a(e).
Connecticut also does not specify that the presumption that useful life has ex-
pired must be rebutted with clear and convincing evidence. See id. § 52-
577a(c).
Washington's more liberal statute presumes expiration of useful life after
twelve years and allows rebuttal of the presumption by a preponderance of the
evidence. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.060(2) (Supp. 1988).
71. Arkansas uses the term anticipated life and defines it as the period of
time during which the product is reasonably useful to the user. ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 16-116-102(6) (1987). Unlike MUPLA, the Arkansas statute does not
bar claims, instead making a finding that the accident occurred after the prod-
uct's anticipated life expired only evidence of the consumer's fault. Id. § 16-
116-105(c). Tennessee has both a ten-year statute of repose and a useful life
provision, and the shorter of the two time periods applies. TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-28-103 (1980).
72. Useful life statutes have received only passing mention in reported
cases, and apparently no case before Hodder squarely addressed the construc-
tion of a useful life statite.
In Morse v. City of Toppenish, 46 Wash. App. 60, 729 P.2d 638 (1986), re-
view denied, 108 Wash. 2d 1007 (1987), a failure to warn case involving a mu-
nicipal swimming pool allegedly not filled to the proper depth, the court held
that Washington's useful life statute applied, but remanded to determine the
issue of fact whether the useful life of the pool's diving board had expired. Id-
at 641, 729 P.2d at 641. The court went no further, however, in interpreting
the useful life statute.
Habenicht v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 660 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1986) consid-
ered Connecticut's useful life statute in the context of a conflict of laws issue,
but made no substantive analysis of the statute. Id at 54-56.
In Siruta v. Hesston Corp., 232 Kan. 654, 659 P.2d 799 (1983), the dissent-
ing opinion considered the Kansas useful life statute as evidence of the legisla-
ture's intent that a manufacturer should not be obligated to make a product
that will never wear out. Id at 684, 659 P.2d at 818-19 (Schroeder, C.J., dis-
senting).
Although useful life statutes are not prominent in reported cases, their
impact might be greater in the context of settlement negotiations.
73. Act of April 5, 1978, ch. 738, 1978 Minn. Laws 836.
74. MNN. STAT. § 604.03 (1988) reads as follows:
604.03. Useful life of product
Subdivision 1. In any action for the recovery of damages for per-
sonal injury, death or property damage arising out of the manufac-
ture, sale, use or consumption of a product, it is a defense to a claim
against a designer, manufacturer, distributor or seller of the product
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nesota's statute was a source for MUPLA,75 but the two stat-
utes have some major differences.76 Minnesota's statute differs
most significantly from MUPLA by not creating a presumption
that the useful life of a product expires after a fixed period of
time.77 Instead, Minnesota's statute simply terms expiration of
a product's useful life "a defense" against a claim concerning
that product.78 Minnesota's statute measures useful life with
criteria very similar to those in MUPLA, 79 emphasizing that
the defense applies only upon expiration of the time during
which the product can be used safely.8 0 Finally, Minnesota's
or a part thereof, that the injury was sustained following the expira-
tion of the ordinary useful life of the product.
Subd. 2. The useful life of a product is not necessarily the life in-
herent in the product, but is the period during which with reasonable
safety the product should be useful to the user. This period shall be
determined by reference to the experience of users of similar prod-
ucts, taldng into account present conditions and past developments,
including but not limited to (1) wear and tear or deterioration from
natural causes, (2) the progress of the art, economic changes, inven-
tions and developments within the industry, (3) the climatic and other
local conditions peculiar to the user, (4) the policy of the user and
similar users as to repairs, renewals and replacements, (5) the useful
life as stated by the designer, manufacturer, distributor, or seller of
the product in brochures or pamphlets furnished with the product or
in a notice attached to the product, and (6) any modification of the
product by the user.
For a detailed discussion of the legislative history, see infra notes 122-40
and accompanying text.
75. MUPLA § 110 analysis, cites Minnesota's useful life statute as a pri-
mary source.
76. Aside from the differences listed in the text between MUPLA and
Minnesota's statute, MUPLA also declined to incorporate "progress of the art,
economic changes, inventions and developments within the industry" as crite-
ria for measuring useful life. See UM. STAT. § 604.03(2)(2) (1988). MUPLA's
drafters did not comment on this omission, but "progress of the art" seems en-
tirely irrelevant to measuring the useful life.
77. See supra notes 62, 74.
78. MINN. STAT. § 604.03(1) (1988).
79. MUPLA's list of criteria for measuring useful life is nearly identical to
linnesota's statute except that MUPLA's omits "progress of the art" in its
criteria. See supra note 76. The criteria that MUPLA and Minnesota's statute
share are 1) product wear and tear from natural causes, 2) climate, 3) the
user's repair and maintenance habits, 4) the manufacturer's representations of
the product's useful life, and 5) the user's modification of the product. MINN.
STAT. § 604.03(2) (1988); MUPLA § 110(a)(1)(a-e).
80. The Minnesota statute is unique among useful life statutes because it
states expressly that the useful life of the product is "not necessarily the life
inherent in the product, but is the period durifig which with reasonable safety
the product should be useful to the user." MiNN. STAT. § 604.03 (2) (1988).
This might be construed to place the plaintiff in the unenviable position of
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statute differs from MtJPLA by not providing for exemptions.8 '
Although many states followed Minnesota's initiative by
enacting useful life statutes, commentators remained skeptical
about the value of the useful life concept.8 2 These scholars ob-
served that useful life statutes attempt to accommodate con-
flicting goals: providing certainty for manufacturers while also
creating a flexible standard that varies for each product.8 3
Scholars questioned whether a statute could meet these goals
and remain workable.8 While commentators speculated, how-
ever, courts were not confronted with cases under useful life
statutes,8 5 and the efficacy of the statutes awaited testing in an
actual case.
having to prove that the product was safe in order to avoid the useful life de-
fense while also showing that the product was defective.
The key to resolving this enigma might be the legislature's language that
useful life is the period in which the product "should" be useful. This seems
to create an objective standard, suggesting that the individual product which
caused the accident might be compared to other similar products to determine
the period of time it should have been available bad it lacked any defect.
Under this interpretation, the plaintiff can argue with consistency that the in-
dividual product was defective, while also arguing that the product should
have had a useful life equal to that of similar products.
81. See supra text accompanying note 65 (listing MUPLA's exemptions).
82. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 848-51. Professor Schwartz, although
sympathetic to the goals of the useful life concept, found useful life statutes in
their present form to be "incoherent both theoretically and operationally." Id
at 848. One problem is that useful life statutes do not make clear whether use-
ful life is founded on the increased likelihood of contributory negligence or on
the decreased chance of a defect surfacing over time. Also, definitions of use-
ful life seem to encompass both the useful life of the specific product causing
the accident and of the group of products generally. A court could determine
useful life differently under either method, but the statutes instruct a court to
do both concurrently.
Another commentator criticizes useful life because a statutory bar "mea-
sured by the product's useful life or useful safe life, even if limited by a fixed-
term presumption, involves transaction costs that would seem largely to ne-
gate the possibld benefits of the statute." Martin, supra note 43, at 770. To
Professor Martin, the primary benefit of a statute of repose is certainty for the
manufacturer. See also Comment, Statutes of Repose in Products Liability:
The Assault upon the Citadel of Strict Liability, 23 S.D.L. REV. 149, 177-79
(1978) (considering administrative problem of measuring useful life); Com-
ment, Washington's Useful Safe Life: Snipping off the Long Tail of Products
Liability?, 57 WASH. L. REv. 503, 517 (1982) (arguing that useful life concept is
too amorphous to assist in business liability planning). Even the Task Force
Report was less than enthusiastic about the prospects for using the useful life
concept. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 1045-49.
83. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 848-49.
84. Id, at 848-51.
85. See supra note 72.
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II. HODDER V. GOODYEAR: FIRST TEST FOR THE
USEFUL LIFE CONCEPT
The facts in Hodder made useful life a central issue. The
tire rim that exploded and injured Hodder was twenty-six years
old,86 so old that a jury reasonably could find that the tire rim's
useful life expired before the accident. Further, the severity of
Hodder's injuries87 and the alleged failure of Goodyear to re-
spond adequately to the dangers of its product88 created a sig-
nificant risk of liability for substantial damages. This situation
led Goodyear to advocate an interpretation of the useful life
statute that would bar the claim, while Hodder argued that the
statute did not bar claims. The Hodder case thus demanded
that the court interpret the statute.
No court had interpreted Minesota's useful life statute
before Hodder, and there was little case law from other juris-
dictions concerning useful life statutes.89 At trial, the jury
found that the tire rim's useful life expired before the acci-
dent.90 The trial court nonetheless awarded Hodder enormous
compensatory and exemplary damages.91 The trial court recon-
ciled its holding with the jury's verdict by finding that the use-
ful life statute did not apply. Because Goodyear manufactured
and sold the rim without proper warnings, there never was a
period during which the rim was, in the words of the statute,
"useful to the user with reasonable safety."9 2 The court rea-
soned that because the rim never had a useful life, its useful
life could not expire.93 Because only expiration of the product's
useful life triggered the statute, Goodyear could not assert the
defense.9 4
On appeal, the parties abandoned the trial court's interpre-
tation of the statute and debated instead whether the statute
made expiration of a product's useful life a complete bar to
claims or merely evidence of the consumer's fault to be consid-
86. Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 829 (Minn.
1988), lletitionfor cert filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3296 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1988) (No. 88-626).
87. Id. at 829.
88. See supra note 3.
89. See supra note 72.
90. Hodder, 426 N.W.2d at 829.
91. The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the award of $3,368,916 in com-
pensatory damages, but reduced the punitive damages from $12,500,000 to
$4,000,000. Id- at 841.
92. Id at 830.
93. Id-
94. I-
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ered in determining comparative negligence s5 The Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the useful
life statute did not bar Hodder's claim,95 but rejected the trial
court's conclusion that the useful life statute did not apply to
the case. Instead, the court interpreted the statute,9 7 assuming
that it applied to Hodder' facts.
In its analysis, the court found ambiguity in the language
of the statute that described expiration of a product's useful life
as "a defense."9 8 The court reasoned that because the statute
did not say "absolute defense," the language could mean less
than that, particularly when the legislature in the same session
rejected a true statute of repose that clearly was an absolute de-
fense9 9 Looking to the legislative history for interpretive gui-
95. The parties essentially abandoned the trial court's interpretation of
the statute because that interpretation would eviscerate the statute. Because
any product liability claim involves an allegation of a defect either in design,
manufacture, or in failure to wain, the essential premise of the claim is that
the product never was safe. Consequently, if a product must be shown at some
point to be safe in order for its useful life to expire, it is difficult to imagine a
claim in'which the useful life statute would apply. See Brief for Dale Hodder
at 8-11, Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1988)
(Nos. C3-87419, C2-87-511). The supreme court did not address the trial
court's ruling on this issue.
96. Hodder, 426 N.W.2d at 832.
97. The court's interpretation of the statute was cursory. With only a
brief discussion of the statute's language, id, at 829-32, and virtually no discus-
sion of the legislative history, the court declared the statute's useful life con-
cept ambiguous, id. at 830. The court concluded:
This much is clear. There will be cases where a reasonably pru-
dent user should know a product's useful life has expired and in-
stances where the user has no reason to know or way of knowing.
Goodyear argues that in either case, the user is barred from recovery.
We decline to adopt this construction. Expiration of useful life is a
defense but we think the legislature has stopped short of saying it is
an absolute defense, and it is not for us to take that step, especially in
view of the mixed signals given by the statute.
We hold therefore, that the expiration of a product's useful life
under section 604.03 is a factor to be weighed by the jury in determin-
ing the fault of the manufacturer and the fault of the user.
Hodder, 426 N.W.2d at 832.
98. Hodder, 426 N.W.2d at 830-32. The Minnesota statute states in part
that "it is a defense to a claim... that the injury was sustained following the
expiration of the ordinary useful life of the product." MINN. STAT. § 604.03(1)
(1988).
99. Hodder, 426 N.W.2d at 831-32. The 15-year statute of repose was aban-
doned because the legislature feared constitutional problems. See infra text
accompanying note 124. Courts in eleven states have held statutes of repose to
be unconstitutional because such statutes abolish a cause of action before it ac-
crues. See McGovern, supra note 39, at 581. Unlike a statute of limitation
which commences when the injury occurs, a statute of repose begins to run
from the date of sale and can expire before an accident occurs. Some courts
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dance, with cursory analysis, the court declared the statute's
history ambiguous, 10 0 although the court found that the statute
clearly was intended to limit product liability to some degree.'L '
After acknowledging the statute's ambiguities, the court
next examined the problems in its implementation. The court
noted that the statute failed to clarify whether courts should
measure useful life in comparison with the expected life of the
specific product involved in the accident, against similar prod-
ucts made by other manufacturers, or against an industry
norm.10 2 The court also questioned whether the statute barred
claims arising from "originally defective" products which, de-
spite defects, last as long as typically nondefective products 0 3
Finally, the court thought it unclear whether the statute re-
quired a finding that the user knew the product's useful life
find that this offends a variety of federal and state cqnstitutional doctrines, in-
cluding the equal protection clause, the due process clause, and, most promi-
nently, the "access to courts" provision of some state constitutions. The last
requires a remedy to be available for every injury. See McGovern, supra note
39, at 600-18.
Useful life statutes also are susceptible to constitutional challenge, be-
cause they also bar claims before they accrue. Hodder challenged the constitu-
tionality of Minnesota's statute, but the court did not reach the issue. Hodder,
426 N.W.2d at 830 n.3.
100. The court stated, "[w]e think the legislative history is inconclusive."
Hodder, 426 N.W.2d at 830.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 830-31.
103. The court stated:
There are other problems. The statute surely is meant to cover a
product originally nondefective which becomes "defective" with age.
But how long must a product last to avoid being labelled originally de-
fective? Does the statute also cover an originally defective product?
A product may be defective ab initio, but not cause injury until the
normal life span of a nondefective like product expires. If these prod-
ucts are not covered, as the trial court ruled, the useful life statute is
irrelevant to most products liability claims.
Hodder, 426 N.W.2d at 831.
The court's difficulty with this issue may derive from its faulty definition
of defect. The court's use of the term original defect is improper, because
under Minnesota law, all defects are by definition original. In other words a
defect must be present at the time of manufacture and sale. Worden v.
Gangelhoff, 308 Minn. 252, 254-55, 241 N.W.2d 650, 651 (197.6) (holding that
under any theory of product liability plaintiff must prove that defect existed
when product was in care of defendant); see also W. PROSSER, TORTS § 103
(4th ed. 1971) (collecting cases).
Products do not become "defective" with age, as the court suggested; they
are either defective initially, or not at all. Beyond this definitional hurdle, the
court's issue disappears. The statute covers all product liability claims, which
by definition can include only defective prodticts.
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had expired.10 4
Although the court posed these questions, it attempted to
answer them only through a limited interpretation of the stat-
ute. 0 5 After a brief effort at interpretation, the court found
the statute hopelessly ambiguous and incoherent 06 and conse-
quently gave the statute a very limited effect.'0 7 Expiration of
the useful life of a product does not bar claims, the court held,
but rather is merely evidence of fault for consideration by the
jury in determining comparative liability.0 s As a final note,
the court expressed its skepticism about the useful life concept
and queried whether a workable useful life statute is
possible. 0 9
III. THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF MINNESOTA'S
USEFUL LIFE STATUTE: CORRECT RESULT,
WRONG REASONING
Although the useful life concept presents a variety of tech-
nical problems, the Minnesota Supreme Court's focus on these
problems obscured the real task that Hodder presented-to de-
termine what the legislature intended the statute to do. The
court's cursory analysis of the statute's language and history
laid an improper foundation from which to determine how to
implement the statute.
A thorough analysis of the statute demonstrates that the
legislature intended it to bar claims. The statute's contradic-
104. Hodder, 426 N.W.2d at 831. Although the user's knowledge was an im-
portant issue for the court in Hodder, the statute does not support a require-
ment that the user know that the product's useful life has expired. The court
reasoned that because the statute considered the user's actions in measuring
life, the user's knowledge somehow was implicated. Id. The court offered no
basis for that conclusion, however, and the statutory language does not suggest
one. The court did not hold that the user's constructive knowledge of the ex-
piration of the product's useful life was required under that statute. Id. at 831-
32.
105. The court restricted its interpretation largely to what the statute did
not do. !d. at 830-32.
106. Hodder, 426 N.W.2d at 830, 832.
107. Although the court failed to explain its rationale, this is the best ex-
planation for what the court did. The court explicitly found the statute ambig-
uous, id. at 836, and although the court made a number of observations about
the statute, it concluded only that the statute did not constitute an absolute
defense, id. at 832. The court implied that, in the absence of better legislative
guidance, the statute would be limited to the narrowest possible construction.
Id at 832.
108. Id-
109. Id.
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tory language and uncertain statements by legislators suggest,
however, that the legislature was unsure how to accomplish
that goal. The resulting statute is incoherent or at best vague,
and therefore difficult to implement. This situation would jus-
tify a court's decision to invalidate the statute. In giving limited
effect to the statute, however, the court partially implemented
the legislature's intent while avoiding unintended or absurd re-
sults. A narrow construction of the statute thus fostered a
proper result, even though the court based its construction on
the incorrect finding that the statute was ambiguous.-' The
following interpretive analysis of the useful life statute demon-
strates that the court could have discerned the legislature's
intent.
A. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE USEFUL LIFE STATUTE
In statutory construction, the plain, unambiguous language
of the act is the preferred source for interpretive guidance.",
The critical language in Minnesota's useful life statute is the
provision stating that expiration of the useful life of a product
is "a defense" to any claim.11 2 The phrase a defense intuitively
might appear absolute, representing a statute of repose barring
claims. This language, however, does not resemble the lan-
guage of Minnesota statutes that clearly do bar claims. For ex-
ample, Minnesota's Good Samaritan statute provides that one
who renders assistance in an emergency "is not liable for any
civil damages." 3 Minnesota's product liability statute of limi-
tation also makes an absolute statement, requiring that "any ac-
tion . . . shall be commenced within four years.""114 The
language of these statutes suggests that when the Minnesota
legislature intends to eliminate liability it will state so explic-
itly in the statute, using absolute language stronger than the
useful life statute's phrase, a defense.
Similarly, true statutes of repose explicitly state that the
effect of the statute is to bar claims. Washington's useful life
110. The statute's language presents ambiguities, but the legislative history
makes clear the intent to bar claims. The statute's purpose is thus unambigu-
ous and the court therefore should look to implementing the legislature's in-
tent. At that point the incoherence of the statute would become evident,
because the flawed language makes the statute unworkable.
111. McCarty v. Village of Nashwauk, 286 Minn. 240, 244, 175 N.W.2d 144,
147 (1970).
112. MINN. STAT. § 604.03 (1988).
113. MINN. STAT. § 604.04(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
114. MNN. STAT. § 541.05(2) (1988).
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statute employs the phrase "a product seller shall not be sub-
ject to liability,"" 5 while Connecticut's useful life statute pro-
vides that "no such action may be brought."" 6 Only Arkansas's
useful life statutem7 appears to make expiration of useful life
"a defense," but that statute explicitly makes expiration of use-
ful life only evidence of the user's fault and not a bar to
claims.118
Other language in the Minnesota statute suggests that the
legislature did not intend a bar to claims. The caption of the
bill that became the useful life statute refers to the useful life
provision as "codifying a useful life defense."'' 1 9 Under Minne-
sota common law at the time of enactment, courts considered
expiration of useful life only as evidence in determining com-
parative negligence. o20 The bill's caption thus supports the in-
terpretation that the drafters intended the statute to continue
the common law system, in which a manufacturer introduced
evidence of the useful life of the product to show that a user's
contributory negligence, rather than a defect, caused the
accident.121
B. LEGISLATIVE IMToRY OF MNNEsoTA'S
USEFUL LIFE STATUTE
The language of the statute suggests that it does not bar
claims, but because the statute does not explicitly address this
point, it is necessary to consider the statute's legislative his-
tory. 22 The useful life statute evolved from a bill proposing a
115. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.060(1)(a) (Supp. 1988).
116. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a(a) (West Supp. 1988).
117. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-116-105(c) (1987). The section of the Arkansas
code containing the "anticipated life" provision is entitled "(d]efenses gener-
ally." Id Subdivision (b) of the statute provides that "[s]upplying of a product
after its anticipated life may be considered as a defense by the manufacturer
as between manufacturer and supplier." Id. § 16-116-105(b). Subdivision (c)
provides that "[u]se of a product beyond its anticipated life by a consumer
where the consumer knew or should have known the anticipated life of the
product may be considered as evidence of fault on the part of the consumer."
Id. § 16-116-105(c).
118. id.
119. Act of April 5, 1978, ch. 738, 1978 Minn. Laws 836.
120. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
121. That the sponsor of the bill stated in committee that the bill did noth-
ing more than codify existing law reinforces this conclusion. See infra note
128.
122. Courts routinely use legislative history to supplement the language of
a statute and to aid in its interpretation. See W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 696-98 (1988). Although the Minne-
sota legislature does not generate committee reports, audio tapes of the Senate
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fixed-term statute of repose clearly intended to bar claims after
a fifteen-year period. 23 Fearing constitutional problems, 24 the
Senate abandoned the fixed-term statute of repose25 and re-
drafted the bill, incorporating the useful life concept. Parts of
the legislative history indicate that the legislators intended the
rewritten bill to bar claims just as its predecessor had.
The sponsor, Senator Jack Davies, first introduced the use-
ful life bill to the Subcommittee on Judicial Administration in
the Minnesota Senate, describing useful life as the principle
that as a consumer uses a product over time the burden for
making sure that the product is safe shifts from the manufac-
turer to that user.326 Addressing the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, Senator Davies similarly described the useful life provision
hearings and floor debate provide insight into the legislature's intent. Courts
traditionally have not considered legislative hearings in determining legislative
intent, but the modern trend is one of increasing reliance on such evidence.
IT- at 717-18.
Minnesota courts. may consider audiotapes of legislative hearings when
conducting statutory interpretation. Handle With Care, Inc. v. Department of
Human Servs., 406 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 1987) (holding that although "the
rules of both houses state that the testimony and discussion preserved by the
[legislative] tapes are not to be admissible in any court on an issue of legisla-
tive intent, we do not believe this statement countermands our consideration
of the tapes as authorized by Minn. Stat. 645.16(7). We should not turn a blind
eye to what m-y be helpful and to what is before us.") See also Stearns-
Hotzfield v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 360 N.W.2d 384, 389 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (al-
lowing inquiry into legislative history to determine legislative intent).
The legislators discussed the useful life bill in three recorded debates: on
February 1 and 3, 1978, before the Senate Subcommittee on Judicial Adminis-
tration, An Act Relating to Civil Actions: Hearings on H.F. 338 Before the Sub-
committee on Judicial Administration, 70th Minn. Leg. (1978) (on audiotape
available at Legislative Reference Library, State Office Building, St. Paul,
Minnesota) [hereinafter Subcommittee Tape]; on February 6, 1978, before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, Judiciary Committee Tape, supra note 31; and on
February 16, 1978, on the Senate Floor, Floor Debate Tape, supra note 51.
123. H.F. 338, 70th Minn. Legislature (1978); see also id. (stating that useful
life provision was a substitute for 15-year statute of repose which was aban-
doned due to constitutional concerns).
124. See supra note 123.
125. Subcommittee Tape, supra note 122 (statement of Senator Davies).
126. Senator Davies introduced his bill as follows:
The useful life idea is a substitute for a statute of limitations and it
recognizes the fact that products vary tremendously in the period of
time... that you should anticipate using them with safety. So we say
that after a product has been used for the period of time in which it is
reasonable to expect it to be safe that the burden for making sure it is
still safe to use it shifts away from the manufacturer and to the per-
son who has control of the product and that person can inspect and
repair and keep that product under continuous surveillance to make
sure that it does not become a hazard.
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as representing the principle that, at a certain point in time, re-
sponsibility for safe use of a product shifts to the user. 2 7 Both
of these statements suggest that a manufacturer's responsibility
terminates at a certain point in time, which accords with an in-
terpretation that the legislature intended the statute to bar
claims.
The sponsor's other statements, however, seem inconsis-
tent with such an interpretation, and apparently indicate some
confusion about the useful life concept. After introducing the
useful life provision in subcommittee, Senator Davies stated
that the useful life provision would only codify existinglaw and
mandate a proper jury instruction. 2 8 Later, he asserted his op-
position to a "statute of limitation" measured from the date of
manufacture-a statute of repose. 2 9 Neither of these state-
ments appear consistent with Senator Davies's introductory
statements about the bill or the more concise statements he
127. Introducing the bill in the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Da-
vies stated:
What we're attempting to do here ... is perhaps to get a more helpful
jury instruction which describes the fact that somewhere along the
line in the passage of time the control and the responsibility for the
safety of a particular product has to pass from... the manufacturer to
the person who has control of it ....
Judiciary Committee Tape, supra note 31 (statement of Senator Davies).
128. Senator Davies added:
I think [the useful life provision] probably is very much existing'
law-except by having it in the statute would make it a more appro-
priate kind of jury instruction in some cases as to how the burden or
responsibility for the safety of a product shifts away from the manu-
facturer to the... user of the product-as time goes on.
Subcommittee Tape, supra note 122 (statement of Senator Davies).
Senator Davies's description of the bill is not entirely consistent with Min-
nesota law at the time. See Kerr v. Corning Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169
N.W.2d 587 (1969). The common law did not shift the burden for safety of a
product to the user as time passed. Instead, the common law recognized an
inference that fault more likely lay with the user in accidents involving older
products. See Kerr, 284 Minn. at 119, 169 N.W.2d at 589; supra notes 17, 22.
129. Senator Davies stated:
What the industry wants and which I'm unwilling to go with and
which I think was really knocked out by the Pacific Indemnity case is
a statute of limitations that's measured from the day that the manu-
facturer or builder lets go of the product, rather than from the date of
injury. I just don't think that that holds together and I just wanted to
establish my position on that.
Subcommittee Tape, supra note 122 (statement of Senator Davies). During the
floor debate, Senator Davies explained that the useful life provision was not a
statute of repose, "which is that after the product is put out on the market-
place, at some date in the future no matter when the person might be injured,
there can be no claim made." Foor Debate Tape, supra note 51 (statement of
Senator Davies).
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made later in the Senate floor debate. 30 Moreover, insurance
industry representatives testified that the useful life provision
would have a negligible impact on the product liability problem
and expressed their preference for a statute of repose.' 3 ' The
insurance industry thus believed that the bill was not a statute
of repose (a bar to claims), and no one in the committee hear-
ings stated that the useful life provision would make a signifi-
cant impact on product liability law. 3 2 Senator Davies, the
other senators, and the lobbyists apparently believed that the
useful life provision merely codified existing law and that the
bill would not change product liability law significantly.
Despite the conflicting descriptions of the bill in commit-
tee, Senator Davies clearly presented it as a bar to claims dur-
ing the Senate floor debate. During that debate Senator Davies
stated that "[w]hen the normal useful life of the product has
expired [and] similar products would have been discarded by
[then] ... the manufacturer would no longer be liable."'133 Sen-
ator Dieterich stated the intent of the bill most precisely, ex-
plaining that the "jury can decide that the useful life of that
product has expired and that even though the design may have
been defective you cannot recover against that manufacturer.
That's a limitation on the consumer's right to recover .... -134
Both these statements reveal an intent to bar claims.
To determine legislative intent, the statements of Senator
Davies and Senator Dieterich during the floor debate deserve
130. On the Senate floor Senator Davies succinctly stated the purpose of
the useful life provision: "When the normal useful life of the product has ex-
pired-similar products would have been discarded by that time-that the
manufacturer would no longer be liable." FRoor Debate Tape, supra note 51
(statement of Senator Davies).
131. One insurance representative expressed his concern that the useful
life provision "makes only a marginal contribution to the problem in products
liability. And it will not affect in any significant way that I can see or that my
insurance companies can see, the [availability] or the pricing of products liabil-
ity insurance in Minnesota." Judiciary Committee Tape, supra note 31 (state-
ment of Mr. John Cairns, American Insurance Association). Others made
similar comments. Id
132. See Subcommittee Tape, supra note 122; Tudiciary Committee Tape,
supra note 31; Foor Debate Tape, supra note 51.
133. Floor Debate Tape, supra note 51 (statement of Senator Davies).
134. Senator Dieterich added: "And that's a provision which many of us
were reluctant to accept, and there have been additions to that provision -
which include the provision that a court or jury can consider the useful life
stated in a pamphlet or brochure furnished with the product. That's another
limiting provision." Floor Debate Tape, supra note 51. (statement of Senator
Dieterich).
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substantial weight.135 Unlike the statements in committee, the
senators made these statements before the entire Senate imme-
diately prior to the final vote on the bill.' Consequently, sena-
tors likely relied on these statements to inform themselves of
the nature of the bill, while they may not have been present for
the committee debates. Both senators stated unambiguously
that the bill would bar claims, and most importantly, no sena-
tor rebutted these statements.136 Although the inconsistent
statements made in committee might indicate some confusion
about the intent of the bill, the clear statements on the floor
suggest that any confusion was resolved in favor of barring
claims. 137 Considered in light of the purpose of the bill to limit
manufacturer liability, the weight of the evidence supports in-
terpreting the statute as a bar to claims.
Because the purpose of statutory interpretation is to effec-
tuate legislative intent, a clear statement of legislative intent
should prevail over the statute's ambiguous but somewhat
countervailing language L3 8 One consideration imposed on the
135. As noted, supra note 122, courts have relied more frequently on legis-
lative dialogue and debate in recent years. These statements made during the
floor debates possess all the elements that tend to make such statements relia-
ble indicators of the legislature's intent. One of the speakers is the sponsor of
the bill, likely to know better than anyone else the intent of the bill. The
statements were unambiguous, consistent, and unrebutted. Made before the
entire Senate immediately prior to voting on the bill, the remarks were fresh
in the minds of the senators as they voted. If the remarks did not represent a
senator's belief as to the intent of the bill, a senator would have stated that
different view during the legislative debates.,
Some commentators criticize reliance on legislative debates for interpre-
tive guidance in light of some legislators' practice of inserting "planned collo-
quies" into the record to improperly manipulate the record and create a
skewed appearance of legislative intent. See W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY,
supra note 122, at 735. Although it is possible that the remarks of Senator Da-
vies and Dieterich were planned in this manner, this theory still does not ex-
plain the failure of other legislators to challenge their statements of the bill's
intent.
136. See Floor Debate Tape, supra note 51.
137. These contradictory statements and the inapt language of the statute
also might be the result of the legislature's experimentation with a new con-
cept. The legislators had little guidance from other statutes when they drafted
and debated the statute. Although the sponsor. did rely on the Intekagency Re-
port, Judiciary Committee Tape, supra note 31 (statement of Senator Davies),
that document was a preliminary report and did not recommend specific
language.
138. MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (1988) reads as follows:
Legislative Intent Controls.
The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to as-
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court under Minnesota law,1 39 however, is examination of the
consequences of a particular interpretation of a statute. Consid-
eration of the consequences of a particular interpretation is es-
pecially important when that interpretation would be
impractical and lead to absurd results 40 In Hodder, the pros-
pect of barring claims pursuant to the statute's incoherent cri-
teria for measuring useful life properly concerned the court.
C. PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING IINNESOTA'S USEFUL
LIFE STATUTE
The primary problem with Minnesota's useful life statute
became apparent when the court attempted to use the statute's
criteria for measuring the useful life of a product.' 4 ' The stat-
ute defines useful life as "the ordinary useful life of the prod-
certain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Every law shall
be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.
When the words of a law in their application to an existing situa-
tion are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall
not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.
When the words of a law are not explicit, the intention of the leg-
islature may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the law;
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted;
(3) The mischief to be remedied;
(4) The object to be obtained;
(5) The former law, if any, including other laws upon the same or
similar subjects;
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation;
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history, and
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of the statute.
d.; see also Mankato Citizens Tel. Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 275 Minn.
107, 112, 145 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1966) (stating that purpose of statutory interpre-
tation is to give effect to legislative intent).
139. MiNN. STAT. § 645.16(6) (1988).
140. See Industrial Rubber Applicators v. Eaton Metal Prods. Co., 285
Miun. 511, 515, 171 N.W.2d 728, 731-32 (1969) (per curiam) (allowing the court
to make a "practical construction" of the statute, interpreting the statute to
allow for logical and practical implementation), overruled on other grounds,
Standslast v. Reid, 304 Minn. 358, 231 N.W.2d 98 (1975); see aso State v. West,
285 Minn. 188, 197, 173 N.W.2d 468, 474 (1969) (requiring interpretation of stat-
ute to avoid absurd results).
141. The six criteria in subdivision 2 are: wear and tear or deterioration
from natural causes; the progress of the art, economic changes, inventions and
developments within the industry; the climatic and other local conditions pe-
culiar to the user, the policy of the user and similar users as to repairs, renew-
als, and replacements; the useful life as stated by the designer, manufacturer,
distributor, or seller of the product in brochures or pamphlets furnished with
the product or in a notice attached to the product; and any modification of the
product by the user.
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uct,"'142 which is determined "by reference to the experience of
users of similar products."'143 Use of the term ordinary and the
statute's reliance on the experience of "users of similar prod-
ucts" suggests the statute is meant to measure useful life based
on some type of objective standard.Y4 Such a standard might
be the experience of a "reasonable user," for example, and
would be established by considering evidence of a product's du-
rability as experienced by all users.1 45
The statute's criteria for measuring "ordinary" useful life,
however, require consideration of "present conditions and past
developments," including any product modifications by the
user, the user's repair policies, or specific climate conditions
that might affect the useful life of the product.14 6 In contrast to
the objective standard for determining "ordinary" useful life of
a product, these criteria refer to the individual user's habits of
product use.
Considering the individual user's habits with respect to a
product is inapposite to an inquiry intended to determine an
"ordinary" useful life. If the statute really intends to deter-
mine the ordinary useful life of a product, the individual user's
habits should be irrelevant. The court's inquiry should focus on
the "ordinary" or typical case and not the specific instance. If
an ordinary consumer safely uses a wheel rim, for example, for
ten years, a particular user's modification of his rim is irrele-
vant. The standard in the statute is ordinary useful life, which
is still ten years. The user's modifications should be relevant
only as a separate defense.147
142. MINN. STAT. § 604.03(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
143. Id-
144. The word ordinary is defined as: "Regular; usual; normal; common;
often recurring; according to established order; settled; customary;, reasonable;
not characterized by peculiar or unusual circumstances; belonging to, exer-
cised by or characteristic of, the normal or average individual." BLAcK's LAW
DICTIONARY 989 (5th ed. 1979).
The statute's directive to consider the experience of "users of similar
products," MINN. STAT. § 604.03(2) (1988), creates an objective standard by its
own terms.
145. Evidence of the product's durability as experienced by all users might
include manufacturer's tests and inspections made during the development of
the product, records of complaints concerning product performance, other liti-
gation concerning the product, safety tests by government agencies, consumer
groups or industry associations, surveys of users, accident reports, and other
similar evidence.
146. MINN. STAT. § 604.03(2) (1988).
147. Modification of a product may support a defense against a product lia-
bility claim under Minnesota law. See supra note 29.
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Measuring ordinary useful life by reference to particular
acts of the user thus presents a confusing, if not impossible,
task for a jury. For this reason, the Hodder court correctly
found the statute internally inconsistent. 4 8 Although worka-
ble interpretations are possible,149 a court could only guess how
the legislature intended to measure useful life.' 50 The Minne-
sota useful life statute's position as the first in the nation exac-
erbates this interpretive difficulty, because the legislature
developed the statute's language without guidance from any
model code or other statute.' 5 ' The court consequently had lit-
tle experience from other states to guide its interpretation. 5 2
Faced with the predicament of a discernible legislative pur-
pose but unworkable statutory language, the court reasonably
might have invalidated the statute and required the legislature
to articulate a more coherent definition of useful life.253 Seen
148. Hodder, 426 N.W.2d at 830-31.
149. One possible interpretation is to consider the statute's references to
the user to mean the "ordinary" user and not the plaintiff. The criteria for
measuring useful life then become consistent with the definition of useful life.
Consideration of the user's conduct would be generalized-that is, a considera-
tion of how "ordinary" use of the product affects durability of the product.
Legislative history suggests, however, that the legislature intended consid-
eration of the plaintiff's specific use of the product. As an example of the stat-
ute's intended effect, Senator Davies stated that the statute would bar the
claim of a consumer who let a lawnmower's noise muffler rust off. Hodder,*
426 N.W.2d at 831 n.4. Consideration of the user's repair policies, one of the
criteria for measuring useful life in the statute, is used in the example to mean
consideration of the plaintiff's specific repair policies.
150. As the court noted, the statute could be intended to measure the use-
ful life of the product involved in the accident, all similar products made by
the same manufacturer, or a generic or industry norm. Hodder, 426 N.W.2d at
830-31.
151. The Task Force Report, supra note 31, preceded Minnesota's statute
and was a source for the legislature. Floor Debate Tape, supra note 51 (state-
ment of Senator Davies). The Task Force Report made only general recom-
mendations, however, and proposed no specific language. MUPLA, which was
based on the findings of the Task Force Report, was published in 1979, after
enactment of Minnesota's statute.
152. For a discussion of what little case law exists concerning useful life
statutes, see supra note 72.
153. The statute might be invalidated as too vague. See Getter v. Travel
Lodge, 260 N.W.2d 177, 180 (Minn. 1977) (holding that statute should be up-
held unless its terms are so uncertain and indefinite that after exhausting all
rules of construction it is impossible to ascertain legislative intent). In Hodder,
the court could not determine the legislature's intended method to measure
useful life because the language of the statute did not clarify whether useful
life should be measured with regard to an individual product, a group of prod-
ucts, or a generic standard. See supra note 102. Without a method to measure
useful life, the statute arguably cannot be implemented. Cf. In re Adams, 619
F.2d 216, 222 (2d Cir.) (stating that "result of an obvious mistake should not be
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in this light, the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision to con-
strue the statute narrowly was generous and served two pur-
poses. The court avoided the absurd and unintended result of
barring claims based on an incoherent standard. Additionally,
the court implemented the legislature's intent to limit product
liability, at least to some degree, by adding statutory empha-
sis154 to the common-law prolonged safe use doctrine.'5 5
Although the result in Hodder is proper considering the
statute's incoherence, the court leaves the legislature's intent
largely unfulfilled. Hodder is a step toward fulfilling the legis-
lature's intent, however, because it outlines the definitional
problems legislatures must resolve before courts can allow a
useful life statute full effect.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF HODDER FOR USEFUL
LIFE STATUTES
The interpretive problems encountered in Hodder reveal
the complexities inherent in the useful life concept. It is partic-
ularly important to address problems arising from Minnesota's
statute because MIPLA and the useful life statutes of several
other states borrowed heavily from the language of the Minne-
sota statute.15 Significantly, MIUPLA and most state useful life
statutes use criteria for measuring useful life that are nearly
identical to those in Minnesota's statute 57
A. WORKABLE CRITERIA FOR MEASURING USEFUL LIFE
As discussed above, Hodder demonstrates that Minnesota's
statutory criteria for measuring useful life do not accord with
the statute's definition of useful life.15 8 The statute's definition
of useful life creates an objective "ordinary user" standard,
while the criteria for measuring useful life mandate considera-
enforced, particularly when it 'overrides common sense and evident statutory
purpose"' (quoting United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 26 (1948)), cert de-
nied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980). In Hodder, the statute's incoherent definition might
be characterized as a mistake.
154. As already noted, supra notes 127-28, the bill's sponsor stated in com-
mittee that the bill was intended only to give statutory emphasis to existing
common law governing claims on older products and to obtain a better jury
instruction in such cases.
155. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
156. See spra notes 66-75.
157. Id-
158. See sulpra text accompanying notes 142-53.
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tion of individual user habits. 159 To make useful life statutes
xiore workable, useful life should be measured in the same
manner in which it is defined-that is, .measured separately
from any consideration of an individual user's conduct. This
makes useful life solely an objective "ordinary user" standard.
This approach simplifies the process of measuring useful life
and comports with the conceptual underpinnings of useful life.
Moreover, nothing is lost by using this measure, because a
finder of fact still may consider the user's conduct through
other affirmative defenses.
Consideration of the user's conduct needlessly complicates
the process of measuring useful life. The common law recog-
nizes a variety of product liability defenses based on the user's
conduct, 160 and common-law defenses already exist for the
kinds of user conduct specified in the statutory criteria.161
Thus, the statute's consideration of the individual user's con-
duct overlaps existing common-law defenses, and is redundant
unless consideration of such conduct is essential in determining
useful life. Closer analysis shows that, far from being essential,
the individual user's conduct is not even relevant in measuring
useful life.
The useful life concept is based on a generalization that
product liability claims involving older products have less
merit. Three premises support this generalization: prolonged
safe use of a product gives rise to an inference that there is no
defect;1 62 prolonged safe use of a product allows greater chance
for contributory negligence;163 and manufacturer's records be-
come stale over time, diminishing the accuracy of judgments. 164
None of these propositions depend for their validity on any spe-
cific evidence of the individual user's conduct. As an obvious
example, manufacturer's records become stale at the same rate,
irrespective of the user's conduct. The two other propositions
159. Of the statute's six criteria for measuring useful life, only the provi-
sions covering "wear and tear from natural causes" and representations of use-
ful life made by the manufacturer are objective criteria that would lead to the
determination of a product's "ordinary" useful life. The statute's other consid-
erations of "climate and local conditions peculiar to the user," the user's repair
policies, and the user's modification of the product all bear on how the individ-
ual plaintiff acted. The remaining criterion, "progress of the art,' seems en-
tirely irrelevant to measuring useful life.
160. See supra notes 27-30.
161. Id-
162. See supra note 22.
163. Id
164. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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do not depend on specific evidence because they operate in lieu
of specific evidence. They rationalize a statute of repose by
lending support to the idea that a court can bar claims without
specific consideration of fault and with minimal risk of barring
meritorious claims. These propositions are essentially conclu-
sive presumptions that the product had no defect or the user
was contributorily negligent. Because the -presumptions -are
conclusive, specific evidence of the user's conduct is
superfluous.
Because a statute of repose supplants the need for specific
evidence of fault, such a statute bars claims irrespective of the
user's conduct. With a fixed-term statute of repose the only el-
ement to consider is time-that is, whether the specified time
has passed after which claims are barred. A useful life statute
of repose introduces only one other element, consideration of
each individual product's durability in determining the repose
period. Measuring useful life, then, should depend on only two
variables-the product and lapse of time. The court's inquiry
thus focuses on how long the product safely lasts over time.
The answer is inherent in the product, not in the actions of the
individual user,165 and the relevant facts are evidence of the
product's durability as experienced by the product's users as a,
group.
1 6 6
To implement the useful life concept properly, a statute
should eliminate all references to the individual user's habits
with respect to the product. This does not mean that a court
should not consider factors like user modification or improper
maintenance of a product. Such evidence is relevant, but it
should be considered apart from the useful life issue, as a sepa-
rate defense. An ideal statute makes expiration of a product's
useful life an outside limit to manufacturer liability, retaining
evidence of the user's conduct as an affirmative defense that
may further limit liability. This Comment proposes a model
statute incorporating these ideas in the following section.
B. A MODEL USEFUL LIFE STATUTE
I. Definition of Useful Life
The useful life of a product is the period during which the prod-
uct ordinarily is useful and reasonably safe to use.
165. Actions of users in general, however, would contribute to the determi-
nation of an "ordinary" useful life.
166. For examples of such evidence, see supra note 145.
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IL Statute of Repose
Except as provided in section V of this Act, no product liability
claim may be brought when the useful life of the product causing the
accident expired before the accident.
III. Measurement of Useful Life
(a) The useful life of a product is measured by considering the
typical experience of the ordinary user of the product or a similar
product. Relevant evidence in this inquiry shall include, but is not
limited to, statistics, surveys, other records documenting the durabil-
ity of the product type, and the manufacturer's representations at the
time of sale of the product's useful life.
(b) Evidence of the manufacturer's representations, at the time
of sale, of the product's useful life may be considered to the extent
they are supported by reliable evidence.
(c) Useful life of a product may be measured in units of time or
in other units that accurately gauge the useful life of the product.
IV. Evidence of the User's Conduct
Evidence of a particular user's conduct or the plaintiff's conduct
with respect to the product shall not be considered in measuring the
useful life of the product. Nothing in this Act, however, shall be con-
strued to limit or abridge any common-law or statutory defense to a
product liability claim based on th& user's or plaintiff's conduct.
V. Exemptions
This Act does not apply to claims involving fraud or misrepresen-
tation by the manufacturer, distributor or seller, express warranties,
or cases where prolonged exposure to a defective product before the
expiration of the product's useful life results in injury discovered af-
ter the product's useful life expiied.
The proposed model statute has several advantages over
the Minnesota or the MitPLA approach. The primary advan-
tage lies in the provisions for defining and measuring useful
life.167 Both provisions make clear that useful life is measured
by an objective standard considering ordinary useful life and
not the facts from the individual case. Unlike Minnesota's Act,
the model statute uses appropriate language indicating that its
purpose is to bar claims,168 and expressly separates the useful
life defense from affirmative defenses based on the user's con-
duct. 6 9 The proposal incorporates MUPLA's provision for ex-
emptions,1 70 and also provides that useful life may be measured
in units other than time when appropriate.1'7
In sum, the provisions of the model statute eliminate the
167. See MODEL USEFUL LiE STATUTE §§ I & III, supraz text preceding
note 167.
168. * MODEL USEFUL LIFE STATUTE § II, supra text preceding note 167.
169. MODEL USEFUL LIFE STATUTE § IV, supra text preceding note 167.
170. MODEL USEFUL LIFE STATUTE § V, supra text preceding note 167.
171. MODEL USEFUL LIFE STATUTE § 1I1(c), supra text preceding note 167.
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unnecessary and troublesome consideration of user conduct in
determining useful life and also provide clear and flexible stan-
dards for determining useful life. Although the model statute
will not relieve a court of its complex task of determining use-
ful life in a given case, the proposal at least clarifies what the
task is, and provides reasonable guidance for the finder of fact.
As an illustration of how this statute would work, consider
a case involving a ten-year-old automobile tire-rim that causes
injury to a plaintiff. The dourt determines the.useful life of the
rim by considering evidence such as the experience of other
users of similar rims; available government, consumer group, or
industry safety studies concerning the rim; and the representa-
tions of the manufacturer?' 2 If the ordinary useful life of the
rim exceeds ten years, the claim -is allowed. This would not re-
solve the issue of liability, however, because the manufacturer
could then assert the next tier of defenses based on the actions
of the plaintiff, such as modification, improper maintenance,
and other affirmative defenses.173 In this analysis, the user's ac-
tions still might be superseding causes or might otherwise limit
the manufacturer's liability.174
C. TE FUTURE OF USEFUL LIFE STATUTES
Measuring useful life through an objective, "ordinary user"
standard makes a useful life statute internally consistent and
conceptually rigorous. Along with this improvement to Minne-
172. Representations of the manufacturer are helpful but should not be
dispositive, as is provided by the Arkansas statute. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-
116-105(b) (1987). The problem with the Arkansas approach is that a manufac-
turer may be biased toward a short useful life, which would limit its own lia-
bility. Although this risk is mitigated by a manufacturer's business incentive
to promote the durability of its product, the risk of bias is significant enough
to impel a court to make an independent judgment of the useful life of the
product. See MAUPLA § 110 analysis.,
173. See supra notes 27-30.
174. The criteria relating to the individual user's habits with respect to the
product are all covered by common-law defenses. Thus, modification, the obvi-
ousness of the hazard, improper use, and other common-law defenses serve to
protect the manufacturer as the legislature intended, but they constitute sepa-
rate defenses. For a discussion of the common-law defenses, see supra notes
27-30 and accompanying text.
Separating these common-law defenses from the useful life defense makes
clear the role of a useful life statute. Not a catch-all mixing a variety of prod-
uct liability defenses, useful life statutes enforce the principle that manufac-
turers are not liable for injuries caused by products used after they should no
longer be expected to perform safely. This time-dependent principle has its
roots in the common law. See supra notes 17, 22. The useful life statute em-
phasizes the common law and makes it permanent.
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sota's statute, the legislature should consider refinements made
to useful life statutes in other states after the enactment of
Minnesota's statute. Some states, for example, provide exemp-
tions for special cases such as fraud, express warranties, and
prolonged exposure to a defective product, allowing claims
when a bar offends public policy.175
A more fundamental need is re-evaluation of the policy ba-
sis for barring product liability claims at all. Commentators
have demonstrated the conceptual flaws in the notion that old-
product liability claims have less merit, and statutes of repose
really were not enacted with the conceptual basis in mind.176
Legislatures instead responded to a perceived product liability
crisis and sought to bar claims to relieve manufacturers of lia-
bilityY'7 Certainty was the goal, and if legislatures now find
that the added certainty of a statute of repose is not necessary
to make product liability insurance affordable and available,
there is no valid argument for a statue of repose. The evidence
available today indicates that the product liability crLsis was
much more a perception than a reality.17s
Although legislatures should reconsider whether a statute
of repose of any kind is desirable, a legislature choosing to en-
act a statute of repose should not reject useful life as an un-
workable concept. Despite its complexities, useful life is a
valuable improvement over a fixed-term statute of repose, be-
175. See MUPLA § 110 analysis (discussing rationale of these exclusions);
see also proposed MODEL USEFuL LIFE STATUTE § V, supra text preceding note
167.
176. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 842-48.
177. See supra notes 31-36, 51-53, 74.
178. Critics have expressed skepticism about. the "product liability crisis"
since its first stirrings in the mid-1970s. See Phillips, supra note 50, at 664-65.
The conceptual basis for a product liability statute of repose is flawed,
Schwartz, supra note 21, at 842-48, and insurance industry studies contradict
manufacturer's claims that certainty is essential to reduce excessive liability
insurance rates, see Phillips, supra note 50, at 644-45 n.31; cf. MINNESOTA JUS-
TICE FOUNDATION, MINNESOTA JURY VERDIcTs 1982-1987 (1988) (available from
Minnesota Justice Foundation, University of Minnesota Law School) (showing
no trend of increasing jury verdicts for plaintiffs in Minnesota courts). Even
the Department of Commerce, when developing MUPLA, stopped short of
validating the alleged relationship between older-product liability claims and
insurance rates, stating that "[tihe limited available data show that insurers'
apprehension about older products may be exaggerated." MUPLA § 110 analy-
sis. The MUTPLA analysis concluded only that older-product liability claims
had the potential to affect insurance rates adversely. Id. If the product liabil-
ity crisis is indeed an illusion, legislatures should find that a healthy business
environment does not require the strong medicine of barring otherwise meri-
torious claims through enactment of a statute of repose.
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cause the useful life statute will bar fewer meritorious claims
than an arbitrary fixed-term statute of repose.179 Although this
Comment does not purport to solve all the problems associated
with the useful life concept, the proposed statute set out
above 180 addresses the main problem the Hodder court faced:
the inherent contradiction of determining "ordinary" useful life
by considering an individual user's habits. By eliminating ex-
amination of the individual user's conduct, useful life is mea-
sured properly by considering the only relevant elements, the
product and lapse of time.
CONCLUSION
The Minnesota legislature enacted a useful life statute to
limit product liability claims arising after the useful life of the
product expired. Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. is the
first case interpreting a useful life statute. The court held that
Minnesota's useful life statute did not bar claims, but only
made expiration of a product's useful life evidence of the user's
fault. The court also found the statute incoherent and ques-
tioned the value of the useful life concept. The court's observa-
tions have broad import, because many states have enacted
useful life statutes similar to the Minnesota statute.
This Comment argues that Minnesota's useful life statute
was intended to bar claims, but that the statute's language is in-
ternally incoherent and unworkable. The statute's primary
problem is that it defines useful life objectively as a product's
"ordinary" life, but sets out criteria for measuring useful life
that include consideration of the individual user's conduct. The
difficulty in applying the statute's subjective criteria to its ob-
jective standard makes the court's narrow construction accepta-
ble as the best means to effect the legislature's intent.
Although Minnesota's statute is internally incoherent, the
179. By accounting for variability in the useful lives of different products, a
useful life statute avoids the inequity of barring claims for products with use-
ful lives longer than an arbitrary repose period. Although useful life statutes
avoid the problem of arbitrariness, they still may bar meritorious claims when
a defect does cause the injury. Manufacturers are culpable for a defective
product even if the defect does not cause an injury until after the product's
useful life expires. The useful life statute frees manufacturers from liability
in this situation. Barring some valid defect claims is the cost of providing cer-
tainty for manufacturers, and although useful life mitigates this problem, it
does not eliminate it. A legislature should consider carefully whether such a
bar to claims is really necessary.
180. See supra text preceding note 167.
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useful life concept is workable. This Comment proposes a
model useful life statute that separates affirmative defenses
based on the user's conduct from the useful life concept. Sepa-
rating examination of the individual user's conduct from useful
life makes the useful life statute coherent, because useful life is
measured by considering the only relevant elements-the prod-
uct and lapse of time. The proposed statute thus addresses the
main problem confronting the Hodder court by providing co-
herent standards for measuring useful life. The proposed stat-
ute should improve useful life statutes in other states as well,
because MUPLA and most state statutes follow the Minnesota
model to some degree.
Keith Moheban
